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CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM FAILS IN
THE FREE STATE:
The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-68*
JOHN P. WHEELER, JR.t
On May 14, 1968, the voters of Maryland dealt a crushing blow
to constitutional reform in The Free State. By a surprising vote of
367,10, to 284,033, they rejected a proposed constitution which had
been written by a popularly chosen Convention, endorsed by the
civic, political and business leadership of the state, and hailed by
civic reformers everywhere as one of the most forward looking docu-
ments to come out of the states. This vote was no freak result from
a small turnout. About 46 per cent of the electorate participated, an
outstanding turnout compared to normal votes in such elections,1
a vote that repudiated completely the Convention leadership's claim
that a turnout of 25 per cent or greater would insure passage of the
proposed constitution. Only in the two Washington suburban coun-
ties, Prince George's and Montgomery, did the constitution muster
majority support and even there the margins were smaller than hoped
for and expected. Populous Baltimore County turned in a 2 to 1
margin against the document in a turnout of nearly 124,o00 voters.
Only 46.2 per cent of the voters in Baltimore City voted "Yes." The
electorates in the 6 rural counties of the Eastern Shore, Southern,
and Western Maryland are small, containing few of the state's voters,
but those voters turned out in amazingly large numbers producing
majorities against the constitution that varied from 68 to 85 per cent.
Few dreamed of defeat for the document, even among the oppon-
ents. Surely, warning signs of growing dissatisfaction appeared here
and there and some old line politicians predicted defeat, but few in
the leadership of either side took these seriously. If defeat was un-
*This article is adopted from a book written by Dean Wheeler and Melissa
Kinsey which will be published later this year by the National Municipal League.
tDean of Hollins College and Professor of Politics. B.S., 1950, M.S., 1951, Florida
State University; Ph.D. 1958, Syracuse University. Dean Wheeler serves as con-
sultant to the National Municipal League on state constitutional matters and
previously served that organization as director of its State Constitutional Studies
Program.
'The total Maryland vote was 651,134 as compared to voter participation in
other recent constitutional referenda which averaged only 4oo,ooo.
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expected, its magnitude was a total surprise. All tangible evidence
pointed clearly to success for the proponents of change.
Several ad hoc groups had sprung up in opposition but few
permanent interest groups gave battle to the document. Principally
in opposition were those organizations whose members had tangible
vested job interests-the state organizations of the sheriffs, registers
of wills, and clerks of court. But almost every other interest group
bureaucracy endorsed the proposed constitution-the labor unions,
chambers of commerce, bar associations, League of Women Voters.
Press coverage in the metropolitan area was sympathetic, although
the rural press was, on the whole, opposed. The personal endorse-
ments of the constitution read like a "Who's Who" of Maryland's
business, civic, educational and political leadership. The "establish-
ment" strongly backed the constitution.
Just six days before the fateful vote, the Evening Sun of Baltimore
carried parallel stories of the campaign efforts of the proponents and
opponents. The headlines reflect their messages: "SUPPORTERS
ARE A WELL-KNIT ARMY, ABLY FINANCED, AND SURE OF
VICTORY - ADVERSARIES ARE UNORGANIZED, HAVE
LITTLE MONEY OR CONFIDENCE.
' 2
That is the way things looked in early May.
And then came May 14 th.
This article is basically a narrative, describing the principal events
of the effort to achieve constitutional reform in Maryland. It is not
an intensive analysis although some interpretations are offered. Part
I describes the steps leading to the Constitutional Convention of
1967-68. Part II treats some of the features of that Convention, its
organization and operation. The significant changes proposed by the
Convention are dealt with in Part III. Part IV capsules the campaign
over ratification of the Convention's product-the issues, their appeal,
the contending forces. In the brief conclusion, the author's viewpoint
on the causes of defeat is presented-with no apologiesl
I. STEPs LEADING TO THE CONVENTION
Constitutions are so much a part of American life, so important
to the functioning of government, state governments particularly,
that the process of their revision or amendment can hardly be said
to have a beginning or an ending. Indeed like the legislative process
it is constant; the only variables are the particular stage at which
the process might be and the intensity with which it might be pursued
-Baltimore Evening Sun, May 8, 1968 at i.
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at a given moment. Nevertheless, some facts about the recent effort
in Maryland can be arbitrarily selected for emphasis.
In 193o the voters of Maryland cast their ballots for the calling
of a Constitutional Convention. The majority was small but clear-
53.4 per cent, but the low turnout on this question-2o2,o52-was a
fraction of those voting in the election and since the controlling
constitutional provision referred specifically to a "majority of voters
at such election or elections" the General Assembly did not feel
obligated to follow through with arrangements for such a gathering.
There was a repeat performance in 1950 when the vote FOR over-
whelmed that AGAINST, 200,439 to 56,998; and the results were
exactly the same: legislative inaction. Throughout the 1950's, though,
agitation continued both within the legislature and without, particu-
larly as problems of apportionment became more acute and pressing
upon the surburban majority. The breaking of the logjam on calling
a convention had to await reapportionment and the unleashing of
the reform pressures that reapportionment stimulated. In 1964, the
Supreme Court of the United States ordered both Houses of the
Maryland General Assembly reapportioned according to the principle
of one-man one-vote,3 an action that brought dramatic and far-reaching
shifts in the power structure of the State.
4
A. The Maryland Constitutional Convention Commission.
The appointment by Governor J. Millard Tawes of the Maryland
Constitutional Convention Commission in June 1965 symbolized the
break with past inaction. Governor Tawes, out of both personal
conviction and a recognition of the handwriting on the wall, determin-
ed to push for constitutional revision. He asked the 1965 General
Assembly to provide for a commission to study the constitution and
prepare, if the need appeared, for a constitutional convention. The
General Assembly rebuffed him, the recalcitrant Senate Judiciary
Committee refusing to vote on the bill even though the House of
Delegates had already passed it. Tawes reacted by appointing a
twenty-seven member commission on his own authority with executive
3Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
'E.g., The Southern and Eastern shores of Maryland had a total representation
of 47 seats in the Legislature before reapportionment; after reapportionment the
same area had a total representation of only 23 seats. Correspondingly, the repre-
sentation in the urban and suburban areas of Baltimore and the suburban areas
of Washington increased from 79 to io6. Report of the Constitutional Convention
Commission of Maryland 68 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Commission Report).
[Vol. XXVI
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funds on June 16, 1965. He named H. Vernon Eney chairman. 5
Eney, a senior partner in one of Baltimore's most prestigious law
firms,0 a former president of the Maryland Bar Association and a former
member of several state commissions was at the time fifty-six years
old. He is a conservative in taste and politics, a Democrat, but largely
inactive in partisan affairs, a man dedicated to public service as an
avocation. Eney's identification with the revision process over the
next three years would be complete, his dedication full, his driving
energy a source of inspiration to many, a cause of friction for some.
The Maryland Constitutional Convention Commission would often
be shortened to the "Eney Commission," its proposed draft to the
"Eney Draft." This was more than newspaper license and popular
abbreviation; to a considerable extent it was descriptive. For on that
document, and indeed upon the entire process of constitutional re-
vision in Maryland, the imprint of Vernon Eney is marked.
Governor Tawes instructed his commission "to conduct an inquiry
into the necessity for, and extent and nature of, any amendment,
modification or revision of the Constitution of Maryland, with par-
ticular respect to whether a constitutional convention should be held,
the procedures for calling such a convention, the basis for representa-
tion at the convention and the procedures for the election of the
delegates thereto." 7 Simply stated, the Commission was charged with
answering three questions: Does the 1867 Constitution of Maryland
need amending or revising? If so, how should it be done? What
substantive changes are needed? Actually, the first two questions were
foregone conclusions. At its first meeting on July 21, 1965, the Com-
mission concluded unanimously "that a complete revision of the
Constitution of Maryland is urgently desirable and necessary."8 At
its second meeting three weeks later, it concluded again unanimously
that the revision should be done by convention. A committee of
three was appointed by Eney to study the question of whether a
complete new draft should be prepared by the Commission. At the
third meeting of the Commission, this group recommended and the
Commission approved the writing of a new document. Unlike the
first two decisions of the Commission, this matter divided the mem-
bers. Some regarded the Commission as only a study group and felt
'Governor Tawes had named William Preston Lane, Jr., former Governor of
Maryland and a highly regarded political figure as Honorary Chairman. Lane,
however, died before the Commission finished its work, but he participated fully
in its activities until his death.
GVenable, Baetjer 9- Howard, Baltimore, Maryland.
Commission Report 419 (1967).
"Commission Report 3 n.6 (1967).
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it would be overly ambitious to undertake a project of such magni-
tude. Nevertheless, once the decision had been reached, committees
were immediately appointed to study the specifics of the Maryland
Constitution.
B. The Commission Draft
The Commission produced a draft shorter than the Model State
Constitution and hardly one-third as long as the existing Maryland
Constitution.9 The Declaration of Rights contains firm statements
of those individual rights which are essential to the maintenance of
individual liberty and sound democratic processes; statements in suf-
ficiently precise language to protect rights which have evolved through
the centuries; statements in sufficiently general language to allow these
rights to expand to meet new needs.10 Both the executive and legislative
departments are strengthened and made more visible to the voters
who must pass upon the performances of the occupants of office.11
If the judiciary article is too long, too detailed, too complete, chalk
that up to the zeal for reform of the lawyer-dominated Commission.
Long efforts to modernize, particularly the courts of limited jurisdic-
tion, had failed and apparently the members of the Commission
did not trust the political branches of government to accomplish
what they believed was necessary. Very little was done to change the
financial powers of the State from those in the present constitution.' 2
The Commission cleaned up, culled out, shortened and clarified
but made few fundamental changes. The most significant proposals
were made in the local government provisions. Home rule was man-
dated for the counties on the basis of "shared power" and the Gen-
eral Assembly was relieved of the burden of local legislation which
consumed its time and attention, creating local governments without
allowing local government. The Commission tried to anticipate
future needs by providing-in far too much detail-for regional gov-
ernments.' 3 Here, as in the judiciary article, the thrust was more
OCompare National Municipal League, Model State Constitution (N.Y. 1966)
with MARYLAND CONST=rToTIN.
=This draft is reproduced in full in Commission Report 71-93 (1967). Fol-
lowing that presentation, there is an extended commentary with respect to these
provisions.
"Compare MARYLAND CONST. art. II and III with Constitution of Maryland
as adopted by the Convention art. 3 and 4 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Proposed
Constitution).
"Compare MARYLAND CONsT. art. III § 52 with Proposed Constitution art. 6
§§ 6.o8-16.
"Proposed Constitution art. 7 §§ 7.03--05 provide for the establishment of
regional governments, changes in their structure, and in their power.
[Vol. XXVI
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for specific institutional reforms than it was toward the development
of a constitution that would allow the political branches to reform
when the public demanded it or their wisdom dictated.
Overall, the Commission draft was a major improvement over
the existing Constitution-if one accepts the philosophy that it
purports to reflect. Likewise, it is a significant contribution to the
literature of state and governmental reform in the United States.14
Perhaps the philosophy can best be understood by constrasting the
old and the new. A constitution is preeminently a political document
and only secondarily a legal one. In its simplest forms, it seeks to
establish the "rule of the game" by which the society will make the
decisions and take collective action. It prescribes what the community
may do and proscribes what it may not do; it attempts to set that
fine and forever shifting line between collective authority and indi-
vidual freedom. That is the ideal. In practice the constitution as a
political document, has reflected throughout history the interests, the
theories, the felt needs, and the outlooks of its writers. More often
than not a constitution is a reflection of the historical forces playing
upon a society at a given time. Maryland's constitutions have mirrored
the State's problems. The Constitution of 1867 continued the colonial
fears of the executive power and of governmental power generally.15
It also reflected more pressing concerns resulting from the terrors,
disruptions and damage of the Civil War, some of which was fought
on Maryland soil. Subsequent developments in state government both
in Maryland and elsewhere led to greater distrust of government and
further restrictions upon political power. As a result the Constitution
of 1867 as it exists today seeks to diffuse, rather than organize, the
power of the state, places a premium upon a conservative confronta-
tion of problems, reflects a comfort with old institutions and old
ways of doing things, and elevates restraint upon governmental
action above efficiency and responsibility. These are not goals to be
lightly dismissed; they are and have been deeply imbedded in the
American tradition. The question now arises whether adherence to
these goals would not cost Maryland-not just in dollars but in
democratic values-more than the people could afford to bear.
The Commission thought so. The overall cast of the twenty-seven
members was conservative,16 but the conservatism was realistic and
recognized that, to hold on to the truly fundamental values of the
past, accommodations had to be made to contemporary problems and
2See Constitution of Maryland as Adopted by the Convention (1968).
"See Commission Report 59-64 (1967).
'lid. at iii.
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demands. The Commission expressed its belief that the vast expansion
of the national government has in part been due to the inability or
unwillingness of state governments to meet the needs of the people.
Only by strengthening state and local governments, the Commission
argued, can the people retain the opportunity to shape their own
destinies. 17 This may not be a wholly accurate appraisal of the role
of the states or the capacity of the national government for responsive-
ness and responsibility but it is wholly in accord with conservative
thinking.
The Commission capsulized the philosophy which had developed
out of their debates and actions:
[T]he Commission believes that the people of Maryland
desire a constitution which will confer upon the three great
coordinate branches of our state government and upon our local
governments the full sovereign power of the State, subject only
to those restrictions necessary to protect the individual citizen
from an arbitrary, capricious and unequal exercise of that
power. In the Commission's view it is only this type of state
government which can solve the many problems of today,
which, though they now seem overwhelming, are nevertheless
only in embryonic stage. The basic concept and purpose of the
draft constitution recommended by the Commission is to create
a state government which will remain viable in a changing
world.18
Despite the disastrous outcome of the revision effort in Maryland,
the Commission's draft deserves far closer study than can be given
in this article. The impact of the Commission's work upon that of
the Convention can hardly be overemphasized. It provided at the
outset basic materials for study and background. It gave the Con-
vention a major head start in organization and getting underway.
Most significantly it provided a draft constitution as a takeoff point,
a draft that reflected sound principles. The "Eney" draft was not
imposed upon the Convention as opponents were charged, but there
was quiet opposition among the delegates using it. Some wanted to
start afresh. As it worked out, the draft proved to be largely a point
of beginning, not of ending, with the Convention changing or modify-
ing it freely and creating anew when it desired. Its principal contribu-
tion was that it caused the delegates to think afresh about the prob-
lems of Maryland and not to begin from the existing constitutional
structure would probably have encouraged a patching up rather than
a rethinking.
1 Id. at 9.
291d. at io.
[Vol. XXVI
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C. Calling the Convention
The voters of Maryland approved the calling of a convention in
a special election held at the time of the party primaries-September
12, x966, a day known as Defenders Day in Maryland. By calling a
special election the General Assembly avoided the question of whether
a majority voting on the question constituted a majority voting in the
election. A simple majority on the question was all that was needed.
That majority was overwhelming-16o,28o to 31,68o-but there was
an exceedingly small turnout of voters, less than 14 per cent of the
total registered. The question carried handsomely in every county
in the state and overwhelmingly in the Washington and Baltimore
suburbs and in Baltimore City. Delegates to the Constitutional Con-
vention were chosen in a special non-partisan election held June 13,
1967. A total of 735 candidates vied for the a42 delegates posts
producing some ballots which contained up to 63 names. Voter
interest did not match candidate interest and only slightly more
than one-fifth of the registered voters turned out to cast ballots in
this significant election.
Whether partly because of or wholly in spite of the confusion
of candidacies in the small turnout, the election produced an amaz-
ingly competent group of delegates, with widely varying backgrounds
but generally sharing the attributes of good education, civic as op-
posed to "political" involvements, substantial income, and a com-
mitment to reform. A profile of the social backgrounds of the dele-
gates reveals representation from almost every occupational category,
income level, religion, educational background and age group.19 Yet
this does not mean that the representation was evenly distributed.
There was no typical delegate but the model delegate was a white,
protestant, middle-aged lawyer of significant income who worked in
the city and lived in the suburbs. He was far more likely to be a
Democrat than a Republican but his political involvements in the
past had been few. Fifty-one reported no previous involvement in
any political activity-i.e., serving on a party committee, running for
public office, or participating in any official capacity in a political
campaign. Another thirty reported only limited contact such as serv-
ing on a special study commission or holding an appointed govern-
mental position. Two delegates were sitting circuit judges, thirteen
others had previously served on some court; one had been Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals. Only eleven delegates were incumbent
legislators, although twenty-two others had previously served in the
"1Note 16 supra.
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General Assembly. Compared to most constitutional conventions,
political experience and involvement was not a mark of the Maryland
delegate. This fact would ultimately have significant impact upon
the outcome of the constitutional revision effort.
II. THE CONVENTION
A. Getting Under Way
Two significant actions were taken prior to the assemblying of
the delegates in Annapolis on September 12, 1967 to begin their
deliberations.
First, in late June, barely two weeks after their election, the dele-
gates were summoned by the Maryland Constitutional Convention
Commission to gather for a special four-day orientation meeting on
the campus of Goucher College just outside of Baltimore City.
Surprisingly 139 of the 142 delegates responded to the extent of
attending at least one session. Many stayed for the full program, some
residing overnight in the dormitories of the college. Four, one and
one-half hour sessions were held on the first and last days and six
such sessions were held on each of the other two days. The delegates
divided into three groups and rotated from one session to another,
each program being presented three times. The format was fairly
standard: a panel of experts-state officials, political scientists or
other academicians or representatives from other organizations-de-
scribed their activities or their offices or discussed general and specific
problems of constitutional revision. One common theme emerged
from nearly all presentations by state officials: they congratulated the
delegates upon their election, commented favorably upon the need
for constitutional revision in Maryland, and commended the delegates
to the great task remaining before them, but assured them that in
their particular area of operation everything was fine and no change
was needed. The primary purpose of the seminar was to acquaint the
delegates with the actual operation of the state government under
the present constitution; other equally important functions were
byproducts. However, it also gave them an opportunity to become
acquainted with each other and provided the occasion for some
"politiking." At that point Eney, who had been elected a delegate
from Baltimore county was clearly considered the frontrunner for
the convention presidency. Both a liberal and conservative faction
began to form in opposition but no agreement was reached at Goucher
concerning candidates. Indeed most of the delegates, while listening
to all, made no commitment. Eney proscribed any personal quest for
[Vol. XXVI
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the presidency and refused to give his blessings to efforts on his
behalf. But the efforts were nevertheless made, particularly by some
of the eleven members from the Commission who had been chosen
delegates. Principally, the delegates were given an opportunity to
meet Eney and to see the kind of organization that he could arrange
and administer.
The second event of significance was a one-day organizational
session held on July 11, 1967. The rules were adopted and the
officers chosen thus allowing a full two months for the leadership
of the Convention to provide for the organization and staffing of the
Convention prior to its formal assembly on September 12, 1967. The
rules adopted by the Convention after only two hours of debate
varied only slightly from those drawn up and recommended by the
Commission. Certainly the thrust was the same. They provided for
a strong president with broad appointive powers over committees,
committee chairmen and staffs, and charged him with general super-
vision of the Convention operation. The rules also called for a
procedure designed to expedite action while at the same time pro-
tecting the rights of individual delegates and the minorities that
would form in the Convention.
B. The Leadership
The rules called for the election of an honorary president, a presi-
dent and two vice-presidents, all of whom would be delegates, but
the central control of the Convention's organization and procedure
was clearly to be in the hands of the president. The honorary presi-
dent was strictly that. The duties of the vice-presidents were limited
to presiding over the sessions of the Convention in the absence of
the president and to consulting with him on the appointment of
committee chairmen and committee members. Neither would succeed
to the office of president should a vacancy occur but would preside
only temporarily until the Convention could elect another president.
There were other officers called for: a secretary, a chief clerk, a
sergeant at arms, a parliamentarian and an historian, but these
positions were not to be filled by delegates. Later a Convention
resolution directed the president to fill these places by appointment.
J. Millard Tawes, the ex-Governor who had initiated the process
finally leading to the calling of a Convention, was chosen honorary
president of the Convention. The office had originally been estab-
lished with him in mind. The election of the president took place
with cliff-hanging suspense. The usual tedium resulting from the
slow calling of the roll of 142 names disappeared and indeed was
1969]
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replaced with increasing excitement as numerous delegates and
spectators kept their own running tallies. Seventy-two votes were
needed for election by a constitutional majority, although with four
delegates missing or abstaining only 138 votes would be cast. The
first ballot produced a sizable plurality for Eney, but his sixty-five
votes fell short of the needed majority of seventy-two. James Clark of
Howard County, a State Senator of liberal leanings, drew thirty-eight
and William S. James, the President of the Senate, polled thirty-
five. There were flurries on the floor to modify the voting rules to
allow the dropping of the third man if the next ballot failed to
produce a majority, but this was ruled out of order. The second roll
call began. The spectators again began their tallies. The score this
time: Eney seventy-one; James, thirty-six; Clark, thirty-two. The
Convention was preparing for a third ballot when James moved for
Eney's election by acclamation. Clark seconded. The rules still forced
a roll call and Eney was unanimously chosen.
Clark and James were then chosen first vice-president and second
vice-president, respectively.
C. The Committee Structure
Only eight substantive committees and three housekeeping or
procedural committees were called for in the rules. Later, a fourth
housekeeping committee on public information would be added. Each
substantive committee was given a wide area of responsibility and
no committee was set up to deal with a limited issue. There was no
committee, for example, on natural resources as in the Alaska Con-
vention of 1955 or a committee on public welfare as in the New
York Convention of 1967. This ideal arrangement forced considera-
tion of fundamental issues and discouraged consideration or inclusion
of detailed materials that best could be left to the legislature. The
substantive committees with their size as determined by the president
were:
Preamble and Personal Rights (17 members)




State Finance and Taxation (15)
Local Government (ig)
General Provisions (15)20
2"This committee dealt with such diverse areas as public education, natural
resources and the oaths of office.
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The other committees called for were:
Rules, Credentials and Convention Budget (ii members)
Calendar and Agenda of the Convention (8)
Style Drafting and Arrangement (i i)
Public Information (15)
D. Staffing
Eney spent a good deal of time between the organizational session
and the opening of the Convention putting a staff together. This
is not an easy task, for a Convention while a temporary affair, is
sufficiently long to seriously interrupt the usual vocational activities
and responsibilities of job candidates. The brief two months avail-
able plus the pressures of other planning problems-for example, the
selection of committee chairmen and the appointment of commit-
tees-complicated Eney's task. He probably contributed to his own
problems through his efforts to interview personally or at least to
pass upon every person hired. Certainly both the Secretary of the
Convention and the Chief of Staff felt restrained in their recruiting
efforts by the necessity of having to clear the appointments with
Eney.
In a convention structured on a partisan basis, staffing is relatively
easy for the central leadership: Most of the responsibility is delegated
to the parties. However, confidence and accountability may be sacri-
ficed. For the effort at hand the Convention had limited funds, and
none existed to be wasted on patronage appointments. The Conven-
tion needed competent, dedicated workers and the standard of ap-
pointment was merit. Some appointees came directly from the staff
of the Maryland Constitutional Convention Commission.21 The Con-
vention finally filled 1o3 of the 105 staff positions that Eney authorized.
The authorized positions included 3o on the administrative staff,
28 on the committee and research staff, 40 secretaries and 7 duplicat-
ing operators. In addition to the 1o5 staff positions there were the
"'The Secretary, Robert J. Martineau, had been a member and secretary of
that body. John C. Brooks, the Chief of Staff, had been Executive Director of the
Commission. Professor Garrett Power, of the University of Maryland Law School
who had served as Reporter for the Commission's Committee on the Executive
Department signed on as the adviser to the Convention's Committee on the
Executive Branch. Goucher College political scientist, Robert D. Lovey, had been
a consultant to the Commission and became adviser to the Committee on the
Legislative Branch. Some other research, secretarial and clerical personnel moved
from the Commission to the Convention. But on the whole, the majority of the
staff had to be recruited anew.
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pages who were high school students employed for short periods.
Delegates were not provided personal secretarial assistance.
22
E. The Delegates and their Work
Less than one-fourth of the delegates had had any previous ex-
perience in the legislative body. Some may have had a comparable
experience in private organizations, but overall, the group that as-
sembled in Annapolis for the purpose of writing a new constitution
for Maryland was composed largely of amateurs in parliamentary
procedure and novices in politics. Given the limited life of the
Convention as prescribed by the enabling legislation 23 and the
magnitude of the job to be done, one might legitimately have had
doubts about the future success of the undertaking. A convention is
definitely not a legislature but it must function somewhat like one.
The rules of procedure are the essential elements in the process of
making constitutional or statutory law and they can be used as
weapons of politics by experienced individuals. However, this hap-
pened rarely in the Maryland Convention.
Delegates behaved neither as partisans nor as representatives of
geographical constituencies. Indeed many of them strained to avoid
any appearance of responding to such connections. One innovation
in the Convention organization which was not only symbolically im-
portant but had a significant effect upon delegate orientation was
that which required seating in alphabetical order. There was never
any question of partisan seating or partisan organization of the Con-
vention. However, there were pressures to recognize the county con-
stituencies of the various delegates. Alphabetical seating was a way of
discouraging the formation of any political groupings along county
or regional lines. Efforts made to change this pattern, which had been
recommended by the Commission and by the Convention's Rules
Committee, were soundly rejected by the delegates.
On the whole, the Convention ran smoothly, far more so than
one could have expected. Occasionally it bogged down but it quickly
2 2The Governor's budget approved by the General Assembly provided $2
million dollars for the Convention. A small amount of this, $2oooo, was to be
used to finish the work of the Commission; another $750,oo0 was to pay the
cost of the special referendum on adoption of the draft constitution. These sub-
tractions left $1,230,000 in the coffers for the operation of the Convention
and its post-Convention activities. Delegates were paid a flat $2,ooo for the
duration of the Convention, and, in addition each received $25 per day in
expenses.
23MD. Acrrs OF ASSEMBLY ch. 500 (1966) reprinted in Commission Report
452-3 (x967).
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pulled itself out. It failed by nearly a month to make its original
deadline of December 12th, but that deadline was wholly unrealistic.
The legislature had provided 90 days for the life of the Convention.
It also provided, however, that the Convention could extend its
own life by 30 days if the time was needed, a privilege it exercised
in early December. The Convention adjourned sine die on January
1o, 1968.
The final vote on the adoption of the Constitution was 121-3.
While as many as twenty delegates would ultimately oppose the Con-
vention's product, the agreement within the Convention was surprising.
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF CHANGE
Maryland's present constitution contains about 42,000 words, mak-
ing it the eighth longest state constitution. 24 Yet seven states have man-
aged to maintain a functioning government, insure domestic tran-
quility and secure the blessings of liberty with documents of less than
lo,ooo words.25 Length, of course, is not in itself important, but it does
indicate detail and detail indicates restrictions. And restrictions,
when carried too far, defeat the essential purposes of a constitution.
No state constitution is a candidate for a Pulitzer award. Most,
including that of Maryland, are long and tedious, cluttered with
statutory material and obsolete with archaic provisions. They em-
power less than they hamstring. On the whole, the documents are
dull, although something occasionally catches the reader's eye, e.g.,
both the Maryland and South Carolina Constitutions ban dueling,
truly a burning issue.
20
Let the emphasis be clear-the goal in writing a constitution is not
to draft a pretty and interesting document. Constitutions uncluttered
by deadwood and superfluous language may be preferred but such
matters really have little significance in the lives of men. What should
trouble Americans are constitutional provisions that keep governors
from governing, legislators from legislating, judges from adjudicating
and the people from passing meaningful judgments on the actions
of these public servants.
This is what troubled the members of the Convention as they
looked at the Constitution of 1867. They wanted Maryland to have
'See THE BOOK OF THE STATES 15 (1968) which lists the seven longer consti-
tutions as: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma and
Texas.
-See THE BOOK OF THE STATES 15 (1968) which lists the seven shorter consti-
tutions as: Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Tennessee
and Vermont.
"-MARYLAND CoNsr. art. III § 41; S. C. CONsT. art. I § ii.
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a stronger state government, a more representative one, a state govern-
ment that was more visible, more responsible and responsive. The
constitution they wrote and adopted was not perfect but it offered
jgreat hope for improvement and presented a model for other
reform-minded states to consider.
Their efforts failed. The constitution was rejected by the people
for reasons associated with the document and for reasons wholly
extraneous to it. That document will never become law but it de-
serves careful study both for its strength and weaknesses.
Three Main Branches of State Government
A. Improving the Legislature
Legislative reform-along with the strengthening of local govern-
ment-provided the principal thrust for the constitutional reform move-
ment in Maryland. What the Convention did in expanding legislative
powers and responsibilities can be disposed of quickly. So far as the
legislature has plenary powers to act in the absence of constitutional
restraint, almost any constitutional statement becomes a limitation
and any removal of language an expansion. Two specific actions
should be noted. First, more than any other single proposal the en-
dorsement of the "shared powers" 27 concept for local home rule laid
the basis for the legislature to concentrate its concern upon statewide
problems. The massive amount of local legislation that pours annually
from the General Assembly does not produce legislative power over
local government-in the collective sense-but merely serves to buttress
the political power of certain legislators, to distract the legislature as
a whole from its general responsibilities, and to undermine the prin-
ciple of home rule. The second action was really inaction, for the
Convention refused to abandon the extremely tight Executive Budget
System effective in the state since 1915 in favor of expanded legislative
power. Under the present system the legislature may not increase
appropriations provided for in the executive budget or add new
appropriations without imposing a specific tax to provide the income.
Thus the legislature, in effect, is limited to cutting the Governor's
budget. It may not even cut in one area to reassign to another. The
2-The shared power concept grants to local governments all powers except
those which are denied by the constitution, the Legislature or the local charter.
The local governments are free and empowered to govern locally; the opportunities
of such a system are obvious, local government may effectively handle local prob-
lems and the state legislature is freed to handle State problems. See J. DILLON,
COMMENTAIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS 173 (5th ed. 1911).
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effort to give the Maryland General Assembly the traditional legisla-
tive controls over the purse strings failed by a large margin and did
not secure even a majority vote of the eleven legislators among the
delegates.
The structural changes proposed for the legislature were most im-
portant. The Convention decreed single-member districts for the
election of all members of the General Assembly.28 Without question
this issue was the most bitterly divisive one in the legislative article and
one of the few that scarred the Convention and the proposed consti-
tution. Currently, Maryland legislative districts are a mixture of
multi- and single-member districts. The latter result not from any
commitment to single-member district but simply from using the
county as the basic unit of representation. The nine smallest counties
have one delegate each in the House of Delegates. Six counties have
two each, one county three, and three counties four each. Baltimore
City and the larger counties are divided into districts varying from
two members to eight. In all, fifty-eight delegates are chosen from dis-
tricts selecting seven or eight at-large delegates each. In the Senate
there are seventeen single-member districts and thirteen from which
two senators are chosen. This distribution is not that which is called
for in the present constitution, a badly apportioned scheme declared
unconstitutional in 1964, but primarily results from statute.29 The
Commission had not endorsed single-member districts but suggested
a limit of two on the number of senators and a limit of six on the
number of delegates from a district, a proposal that would hardly have
affected the present arrangement. Convention opponents of single-
member districts sought to allow as many as three delegates to be
chosen from a particular district. This effort was defeated handily.
The single-member district proposal was a product of the liberal
reformers who wanted to strike at the heart of political organizations
in Baltimore City and in Baltimore County. The politicos rallied
to the opposition. This decision served to alienate further the poli-
ticians from the constitutional reform effort and certainly made them
lukewarm in support where they did not openly oppose.
The less debatable reforms in the legislature involved a decrease in
the size of the House of Delegates from 142 to 12o and in the Senate
from 43 to 40. Even that slight drop in the size of the House, though,
promised to eliminate the tradition of county representation, for the
smallest counties could no longer justify individual delegates. This
!Proposed Constitution art. 3 § 3.o3.
-MD. ANN. CODE art. 40 § 42 a-e (1957).
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reform served to increase the hostility of these areas toward the new
document. Legislative salaries were taken out of the constitution and
left to statute. Currently the salary is $2,400' plus $25 per day living
expenses which has been added by statute. In the schedule of legislation
attached to the constitution and voted on at the same time there was a
provision calling for initial salary of $8,ooo for legislators. The provi-
sion on legislative sessions was changed from an annual 7o day session
to an annual 9o day session. In addition, it provided two possible exten-
sions: one of thirty days upon the vote of a majority of the members of
each house and the second of thirty additional days upon a three-fifths
vote.3 0 In addition, the presiding officers of the two houses acting in
concert were given the power to call special sessions. The Governor
retained his discretionary power to call special sessions, although not
limited to thirty days as at present, and the Convention provided
that he must call a special session upon the written request of three-
fifths of the members of each house. Thus, while rejecting continuous
sessions as the Commission had previously done, the Convention de-
veloped a plan whereby the legislature through its leadership, or by-
passing that through the members directly, could have all the time
it feels it needs to do its job. The Convention rejected unlimited
sessions in theory but adopted them in fact.
B. The Executive
Of the changes in the Executive Article, three represented major
improvements: (i) reconstructing the Board of Public Works and the
Office of Comptroller, (2) limiting the number of principal depart-
ments and broadening the appointive powers of the Governor, and
(3) granting to the Governor the power to initiate executive reorganiza-
tion. Compared to many states Maryland has a fairly short ballot; at
the state level only a Governor, a Comptroller, and an Attorney
General are elected. Yet in few states is executive power so diffused
as in Maryland. Vast constitutional and statutory powers are vested
in the Comptroller and the Attorney General and, in addition, the
political structure of the state and the ladders of political advance-
ment insure conflict between these top officials. The matter is serious
enough when all belong to the same political party; party differences
magnify the conflict. In the past half century Republicans have oc-
cupied the Governorship for a total of twenty years, but Republicans
have rarely controlled either house of the legislature or elected a
OTroposed Constitution art. 3 § 3.15.
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Comptroller or Attorney General. In that period only three Governors
had not served previously as Comptroller or Attorney General-Re-
publicans Nice, McKeldin, and Agnew. Executive authority is further
diffused through the Board of Public Works, consisting of the Gov-
ernor, the Comptroller and the State Treasurer, who is a part-time
official chosen by the General Assembly. Although the constitutional
duties of the Board of Public W~orks are largely archaic and obsolete,31
statutes have assigned to the Board considerable control over capital
expenditures.3 2 Both in theory and in fact the Governor may see some
important programs and proposals scuttled if the other two members
of the Board oppose him.
The Commission dropped mention of both the Comptroller and
the Attorney General and, of course, the Board of Public Works. The
Committee on the Legislative Branch of the Convention after several
tie votes, voted by a majority of one to follow the Commission recom-
mendation. On the floor of the Convention the issue was so divisive
that several tie votes resulted and the leadership became convinced
that some acceptable compromise had to be worked out. That com-
promise, which was overwhelmingly accepted, left both the Comp-
troller and Attorney General as constitutional officers but the functions
of the Comptroller greatly reduced. He was transformed into a "pay-
master" in the words of one delegate. A Board of Review replaced
the Board of Public Works and the new membership consisted of the
Governor, the Comptroller, an "an officer in the executive branches des-
ignated by the Governor." 33 This arrangement preserved the essential
function from the conservatives' point of view by providing a way to
insure publicity of Board actions while removing the capacity of the
Board to block a Governor's program or to embarrass his administra-
tion.
The second change was designed to give the Governor greater
control over the administrative branch. Maryland currently has over
24o Boards, Departments and Commissions. This proliferation and
the resulting diffusion of executive authority has produced major
problems in coordinating governmental activites, maintaining internal
communication, and insuring responsibility. The sheer number alone
has led to an overlapping of functions and duties and to a general
inefficiency in the operation of the Executive Department as a whole.
The administrative structure is at present wholly determined by the
81MD. CONST. art. XII §§ 2,3.
a'E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A §§ 1-9 (1957).
uProposed Constitution art. 4 § 4.25.
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General Assembly; the Governor is limited to making specific recom-
mendations for change. His role is further watered down by his
limited control over administrative officials. His appointive powers
are broad, limited only by the necessity for senatorial confirmation.
But the terms of such officials are set by law and are not coterminous
with the term of the Governor. This permits them to enjoy a sig-
nificant degree of independence and with immunity to respond or
not as they see fit to the Governor's program. The Convention decreed
that all functions, powers and duties of the Executive Branch were
to be assigned according to major purpose to principal departments
not to exceed 20 in number.34 The General Assembly could increase
the maximum number only by a vote of three-fifths of the members
of each house. In addition, the Governor was empowered to take the
initiative in executive reorganizaion. Following the Federal pattern
and that set in a small number of states, the Governor was given the
power to frame reorganization plans which would become effective if
not vetoed by either house of the General Assembly within fifty days.35
C. The Judiciary
Had the proposed constitution prevailed on May 14, Maryland
would have a four tiered court system administratively headed by the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals with all judges appointed by the
Governor from lists presented by nominating committees. All judges
would be lawyers and would be paid well by the state and fully
employed. 36 The dominant majority in the Convention set about
to bring order to the judicial chaos of Maryland, to embue the whole
system with professionalism, and to centralize the administration of
justice in the state.
A study of the Maryland judicial system released just shortly before
the Convention assembled in 1967 described the Maryland system in
sharp tones:
Maryland's court system is very complex, and unnecessarily
so. There are no less than 16 types of courts with little uni-
formity from one community to another. A lawyer from one
county venturing into another is likely to feel almost as be-
wildered as if he had gone into another state with an entirely
different system of courts. A case which would be handled in
-Proposed Constitution art. 4 § 4.26.
wId.
3'Proposed Constitution art. 5 § 5.14.
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the people's court of one county is handled by a trial magistrate
in another, by the municipal court in another, and by the
circuit court in still another.. ..
The Convention, as the Commission before it, set about to reform
the court system. Here, as with the executive budget system, the ranks
of the constitutional purists, viz., those fighting for a simple constitu-
tion largely devoid of detail with broad grants of power to the legisla-
ture to fashion state institutions and wield power, shrank to their
smallest number. To the leadership the stakes here seemed too high
to trust to the legislature; the system had to be spelled out in sufficient
detail to insure true reform. The system that emerged followed
closely the proposals of the American Bar Association and earlier
recommendations of the Pennsylvania Bar Association.38 Several on
the Committee on the Judicial Branch were active participants in
Association activities; Eney himself had been President of the Mary-
land Bar Association.
Actually the dispute that arose in the Convention and that was
carried into the referendum fight centered on the minor judiciary;
there was little dispute over the application of the principles to the
other levels of the judiciary, particularly the appellate levels. The
smaller counties fought bitterly against losing their courts and state
senators were not happy with losing the patronage that accrued to
them with the trial magistrates as a result of senatorial courtesy. Yet
it was not only the small counties that fought back; the Baltimore
County Democratic Organization felt threatened by these damages
and this probably accounts for the opposition of Dale Anderson,
Baltimore County's executive who became one of the most vigorous
and the most prominent antagonists of the new document.
Sheriffs and registers of wills lost their constitutional status in the
proposed draft and the method for the selection of court clerks was
significantly changed. The Orphans Courts, manned by laymen and
handling probate matters, were dropped, their jurisdiction presum-
ably to be absorbed by the superior courts, thereby eliminating in
each county three positions considered political prizes. These changes
aggravated a large number of incumbents in the positions affected,
and their respective state organizations fought effectively against the
constitution, particularly in the rural areas and also in Baltimore
County and Baltimore City.
"rHE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
OF MARYLAND 1 (1967).
'See Selection of Judges: The Virtues of the Pennsylvania Plan, 41 A.B.A.J.
142 (1955)-
1969]
238 WASHINGTON AND, LEE LAW REVIEW
D. Local Government
The Convention produced a local government article that promised
significant improvement for Maryland. Hammered out in commit-
tee where sharp disagreements gradually melded through compromise
and understanding into consensus, the article seemed to catch the
imagination and the support of the vast majority of the delegates.
It emerged from committee with near unanimous endorsement, one
member dissenting on several points. It faced no minority report
since 20 per cent of the committee was required to produce one. Few
amendments were offered and fewer still survived committee opposition
on the floor. By far, shorter than the articles on the legislature, the
executive or the judiciary, local government consumes less than seven
hundred words in the draft. The article aims at five goals: (1) to
mandate home rule for all counties, (2) to establish the doctrine of
"shared powers" as the controlling feature of state-local relations,
(3) to get the legislature out of strictly local matter, (4) to provide
a workable relationship between municipalities, the counties and the
state, and (5) to lay the basis for confrontation of regional problems.
The present situation in Maryland has been described as follows:
Local state relations in Maryland are characterized by ex-
tensive state administrative control... [but] ... [o]f far greater
significance have been the nature and scope of legislative
control. Within constitutional limits the power and role of
the legislature in the enactment of legislation for local govern-
ment have particularly dominated local state relations and have
brought about a system of local legislative relations uniquely
characteristic of the Maryland governmental system.39
Various counts produced different results but there is no doubt that
a substantial proportion of Maryland's annual legislative product is
local legislation. The problem is, of course, more than one of
legislative efficiency. It cuts at the heart of the concept of home rule.
It deflects the attention of the legislature from issues of statewide
concern. It vitally affects the political structure of the state. Such
pictures are seldom completely black and this one is no exception.
It has been pointed out that "[t]his system has been of particular
value in permitting considerable legislative freedom and flexibility." 40
Maryland certainly has progressed and its existing system of local
government would be an improvement for some states if it could
39BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL R ESEARcI-H, CONTEMPORARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT





be transplanted intact. Yet Maryland is a state of change and contrast
and civic and political leaders alike have grown increasingly con-
cerned about the capacity of the system to solve the present emerging
problems of the Free State.
E. Citizen Participation in Government
The delegates to the Convention of 1967-68 took a fresh look at
the Declaration of Rights they had inherited from the founding fathers
of 1867 and the refounding and amending fathers of the preceding
ioo years. The results of their study and action were clarification,
modernization of language, improvement of form, removal of mean-
ingless or non-constitutional verbiage and a few significant improve-
ments in substance.
Despite the irresponsible charges from the opposition about the
document, the delegates hued close to the existing constitution of
Maryland and resisted urgings to move beyond the traditional political
and civil rights of the American constitutional tradition into new and
untried fields. They rejected, for example, several delegates proposals
on social and economic matters relating to guaranteed employment and
standards of living based upon "decency, dignity and health."
In regard to suffrage, the principal proposed change was to drop
the age for voting from 21 to 19. This proved to be an unpopular
provision with the voters, coming as it did at a time of great turmoil
on some American college campuses. While it is hard to register the
impact of various provisions on the electorate's decision, there is no
doubt that this one weighed heavily.
The writers attempted to achieve a better balance between
representative government and direct democracy by modernizing pro-
visions relating to the referendum. For a half century Maryland has
permitted legislative actions to be petitioned to referendum. Cur-
rently a petition signed by 3 per cent of the number of voters casting
ballots in the previous gubernatorial election is sufficient to subject
to popular vote any act of the General Assembly. If a majority vote
against it, the act is dead. The writers sought to raise the petition
requirement to 5 per cent. This action aggravated the ultra-con-
servatives who saw in the referendum a device for upsetting legislative
action on social and economic matters.
Above all the delegates sought to increase the visibility of govern-
ment by simplifying, by providing more direct access, and by insuring
a proper and fairer presentation. The delegates tried to give the
citizens of Maryland a clearer view of government action and actors
and thus to provide a better basis for citizen judgment.
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F. The Shape of the Document
The resort to a short, simple constitution which focused on the
granting of broad powers and general restraints enabled the Con-
vention to drop much verbiage from the draft. The removal of five
articles dealing with Baltimore City-its elections, the development
of its port, off-street parking, local legislation, and land development
and redevelopment, alone eliminated over 4,000 words and expanded
both the city's and the legislature's power to deal with such problems.
Dropping the provision preserving the inviolability of the "school
fund" at first upset some educators but had no effect other than
shortening the constitution since no "school fund" existed. Broadening
legislative powers eliminated the need for provisions dealing with
the Treasury Department, the Commission of the Land Office, and
the State Librarian, as well as elisors and notary publics, if, indeed,
the need ever really existed for having them in the constitution.
Despite the lengthy and detailed treatment of the judicial branch
in the proposed document these provisions are less than one-half as
long as their counterparts in the present constitution.4 1 The process
of culling and generalizing and removing detail, however, had its
less salutory side as many would have missed the colorful constitutional
districts in Wicomico County. Witness, for example:
Beginning at the point, where Mason and Dixon's line crosses
the channel of Pocomoke River, thence following said line to
the channel of the Nanticoke River, thence with the channel
of said river to Tangier Sound, or the intersection of Naticoke
and Wicomico Rivers, thence up the channel of the Wicomico
River to the mouth of Wicomico Creek, thence with the chan-
nel of said creek and Passerdyke Creek to Dashield's or
Disharoon's Mills, thence with the mill pond of said mills and
Branch following the middle prong of said Branch, to Meadow
Bridge, on the road, dividing the Counties of Somerest and
Worcester, near the southwest corner of the farm of William
P. Morris, thence due east to the Pocomoke River, thence with
channel of said river to the beginning .... 42
IV. THE CAMPAIGN
The opponents of the proposed constitution, however poorly
organized and poorly financed, seized the initiative in the campaign
4 1
Compare MD. CONST. art. IV with Proposed Constitution art. 5.
42MD. CONST. art. XIII § 2.
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for ratification and never relinquished it. The proponents, slow
in starting and late in organizing, were placed on the defensive im-
mediately and remained there. The opponents actually began before
the Convention with the efforts of an ultraconservative organization
called "Save Our State" (S.O.S.) which produced a draft constitution
in response to the Commission's product, a draft that was hardly
more than a slight patching up of the present Constitution. The
opposition campaign quieted considerably during the Convention
but opened again with telling effect after its adjournment. In a
capsule, the opposition campaign, or more accurately, the campaigns
of the oppositions since the opposing forces never formed an effective
central organization, mounted a political attack utilizing slogans,
exploiting frustrations, and stirring fears. The proponents ran an
educational campaign largely sober in tone, often defensive, occasion-
ally apologetic, a campaign that relied heavily upon endorsements
from prominent citizens, political leaders and organizations, a fact
transformed into an opposition charge that "the establishment" was
trying to cram the new document down the throats of the "little
people." The proponents were woefully slow in starting their cam-
paign. Not until March did "Pro Con," the statewide organization
pressing for approval, get organized and start the painfully difficult
job of mounting a statewide campaign. The constitution reform effort
which had run so smoothly, effectively and professionally for over
two years seemed to come to a grinding halt in the days immediately
following the adjournment of the Convention. The major cause
of the problem was failure to make adequate preparations during the
Convention itself so that the campaign could begin immediately upon
adjournment. However, this would have been difficult since the prin-
cipal leaders of the reform effort were in the Convention, which
consumed their full time and attention. Yet it seems there could
have been some citizens group already formed outside the Con-
vention that could have laid the groundwork for an intensive cam-
paign. For weeks throughout the winter, opponents grabbed the head-
lines throughout the state. It is true that during this period numerous
Convention delegates were busy on their own in their respective
areas appearing before civic groups and participating in panel dis-
cussions and debates, some of them in effect devoting almost their
full time to these activities; but little was done of an organized nature.
Researchers into political behavior say that there are two levels
of issues. The first is composed of those issues which are verbalized,
articulated, and discussed. They are the ones that a campaign focuses
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upon. Sociologists refer to these as "manifest" issues. The second level
contains those that are not articulated and that are rarely discussed
but are nevertheless probably the more important. Sociologists call
these the "latent" issues. The political strategist often uses the mani-
fest issues to stimulate public relations based on the latent ones.
Certainly the Maryland experience in the constitutional referendum
seems to offer a case study of this political strategy.
A. The Manifest Issues
The principal verbal issues dealt with the costs that the proposed
document would mean to the taxpayer; the "undemocratic" nature
of the new constitution; the "national conspiracy" to impose upon
Maryland the different system; and regional governments.
Costs. The opponents charged the new constitution would cost
$154 million. As preposterous as this charge was it had a ring of
authenticity since it came out of the Comptroller's office. A subordi-
nate in that department produced this figure, but it would not be
surprising if incumbent comptroller Louis Goldstein participated
because he was sorely piqued by the Convention's downgrading of
his position. The figure included $130 million for county court
houses, based on the fact that if the state were taking over the
judiciary system, it would have to furnish its own court houses!
The Convention leadership rightly branded the statement as politically
motivated and stimulated the production of other estimates which
were varied downward from $12.2 million to $2.4 million. The
latter figure was produced by the Director of the State Department
of Fiscal Research who added that overall savings might actually
be incurred as a result of the elimination of existing inefficiencies.
But these more reasonable estimates failed to dent the opposition's
campaign. How deeply the charge cut is difficult to tell but that it
severely hurt the constitution cannot be doubted. The impact of the
charge was magnified by poor timing of the referendum, one of the
few factors of poor timing that should have been foreseen. The vote
on the new constitution was taken on May 14. Hardly a month before
the state had made its first collection of a newly imposed graduated
income tax designed to increase revenues by $12o million. In addition
to the state levy, the counties and Baltimore City were authorized to
impose their own levy up to 50 per cent of the amount of the state's.
So from a flat rate of 3 per cent the new rates moved, counting state
and local, to a maximum of 7-5 per cent. Thus, it hardly mattered
from a political point of view whether the cost of the new constitution
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was $154 million or $2.4 million or any other figure; the cost of
government was going up. Given the timing of the referendum in
respect to the tax collection, the constitution suffered from the re-
actions to the new tax.
The Convention also invited trouble on this score by going beyond
the removal from the constitution of stated salaries for the Governor
and the legislators. In the schedule of legislation attached to the
draft and to be voted upon at the same time, considerable increases
in salary were provided for the Governor and the members of the
General Assembly. The Governor had had a raise in 1966 to $25,000
and now the constitution writers sought to boost that to $40,000.
Legislative salaries were boosted from $2,400 to $8,ooo. These proposed
salaries were certainly reasonable but, coming as they did along with
the charge of excessive costs, they provided the opponents with
additional ammunition.
Detriment to democracy. "Your basic individual rights are being
reduced from 45 to only 18 articles," charged an S.O.S. Pamphlet. That
many of those matters dropped were hortatory and judicially unen-
forceable seemed to matter little. Two articles culled, for example,
were those repeating verbatim the supremacy clause 43 and the tenth
amendment 44 to the United States Constitution. These articles hardly
diminished the civil rights of Marylanders. Opponents criticized the
dropping of a hortatory article on separation of powers and then,
seemingly with no inconsistency, criticized other changes in the
Legislative, Judicial and Executive articles which would have made
separation of powers more of a reality than ever before in Maryland
history.
The principal charges levied against the new draft as destructive
of Maryland "democracy" related to the strengthening of the Governor
and the abolition of competitive election of judges. "I am not ready
to vote for the coronation of Spiro I," protested Judge Phil Dorsey
before the Committee on the Executive Branch, a variation on the
theme that he and others would often play during the campaign.
Downgarding the Comptroller and the emasculation of the Board
of Public Works figured prominently in the opponents' attack upon
the document. Equally aggravating to the supporters of "democracy"
was the shift to the Missouri Plan (or the Niles Plan as it is known in
Maryland) for the selection of judges at all levels, which eliminated
Maryland's traditional mixed plan of gubernatorial appointment and
"MD. CONST. art. 2.
"MD. CONsT. art. 3.
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popular election. "Democracy" also suffered from the dropping of
the sheriff from mention in the document and from the abolition of
the registers of wills and the Orphans Court. Whether democracy
suffered or not, these positions are of symbolic value in the rural
counties and are of considerable importance to the local political
structure almost everywhere. Politically, the reformers pressed too
hard for purity; some tempering of change and some compromise
with the traditional local power structure may have served to offset
some of the intense hostility generated, particularly from the job
holders themselves. What would have been lost in substance is minor
since there was little likelihood that the legislature would actually
abolish such offices.
National conspiracy. "Mail order constitution," was a catchy slogan
that S.O.S. dreamed up and drove home to the voters of Maryland.
Elizabeth Chestnut Barnes, the President of "Save Our State" and wife
of a judge on the Court of Appeals, was the originator of this charge,
presenting it in an article in the DAR Magazine for February, 1967.
In only six pages, Mrs. Barnes tied together the National Municipal
League, the International City Manager's Association, the organiza-
tions at "Terrible 1313," the Committee on Economic Development
and the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie Foundations into a massive
conspiracy to impose city managers, metro-type government and dic-
tatorial state governments upon the unsuspecting American people.
Reprints of this article received wide distribution during the campaign.
The conspiracy charged hit with heavy impact. It was impossible
to refute, mainly because from a warped point of view there was some
truth to it. Most of the organizations referred to were engaged in a
nationwide effort to upgrade the states along the very lines advocated
by the Commission and the Convention. Those inclined to see bogies
in the closets and under the bed can label this "conspiracy." The
Maryland experience raises the question of how far outside organiza-
tions and "experts" can go in aiding state reform efforts without laying
down the basis for this kind of irrational attack.
Regional governments. The opponents used "regional government"
as an effective bludgeon in the suburban area surrounding Baltimore.
The issue had considerably less impact in Montgomery and Prince
George's counties because there was no central city that could be
pictured as a cancer that would devour the cells of grass roots govern-
ment. But the Baltimore area was a different matter. Confronted
with all the pressing problems of central cities in this country-vast
physical needs, increasing Negro population, rising crime rates, in-
adequate public services-Baltimore City was pictured by county
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opponents of the proposed constitution as poised to strike the suburbs
once the new constitution presented the opportunity. Scott S. Bair,
Jr., County Commissioner of Carroll County, charged that, "[flit would
be a matter of days before my friend Tommy (Baltimore Mayor
Thomas J. D6Alesandro, Jr.) would be calling for a new super
government to include this county. ' '45 The principal attack centered
on the absence of a requirement for a mandatory referendum on the
formation of regional governments. The new constitution left this as
a discretionary matter with the legislature. The referendum is deeply
embedded in the political traditions of the people of Maryland and
the manipulation of the symbol always has political impact. Whether
the opposition on this point could have been undermined by a dif-
ferent approach to more rational schemes of local government is a
matter of conjecture. Certainly regional governments did not have to
be dealt with in the constitution; the writers could have concentrated
on removing any obstacles that might have existed to legislative action.
They had in effect handed the opponents a tailor made weapon to
be used against the new document. Here the writers were intent on
establishing a policy direction, not just on freeing the legislature to
decide in its wisdom and as the result of the political process what
the patterns of local government should be in the state.
B. The "Latent" Issues
Race. Race determined the votes of many in this referendum,
whether consciously or subconsciously. The strategists of the opposi-
tion played on race, not directly but indirectly. When some said
"regional governments" they were communicating "race." When they
pointed to other provisions, they communicated "race." Race and
timing, alone and in combination, played major roles in destroying
the proposed constitution. Already cited is the unfortunate juxtaposi-
tion of the referendum on adoption and the rise in the income tax
that went into effect in April, 1967. There are other examples. The
Reverend Martin Luther King was killed on the night of April 4;
his death set off waves of riots, looting and burning in both Baltimore
and Washington, causing untold damage to property and claiming
many lives. This violence was suppressed only by the overwhelming
force of Maryland National Guardsmen and regular army troops. But
that suppression did not soften the conservative reaction that swept
many sections of Maryland giving impetus to the politics of frustration
5Baltimore Evening Sun, April 3, 1968 at i.
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and despair. To some, constitutional change was associated with liber-
alism and liberalism in turn was associated with rights for Negroes.
Thus, reactions against Negro rioting were manifested in negative votes
on constitutional revision.
These immediate events occurred on top of much longer range
changes which had transformed the political structure of the state
and threatened further changes in the society itself. Reapportionment
had hit Maryland hard, almost devastating the existing power structure
at the state level and dramatically shifting legislative power from the
rural areas of the state to the Washington and Baltimore suburbs.
46
The fastest growing parts of the state, and indeed among the fastest
growing in the nation, are Montgomery and Prince George's counties,
filling up with outsiders who serve the federal government and who
look principally to Maryland for a bedroom and a school. These
people are suspect in the eyes of provincial Marylanders and the
sharp increase in their numbers portended dreadful changes for the
state.
Maryland is a border state which really means that she is part
southern and part northern and she has had to absorb open housing
legislation and other civil rights measures in recent years. As one
weekly newspaper editor put it:
I think the opposition capitalized on fear which is pretty
effective ammunition. I think the voters rejected it because
they have had change up to their you-know-whats. So much
has happened to upset the status quo over the past decade
that given an opportunity to reject one element of change the
voters did just that.47
The "Single Package Deal." The Convention prepared a new
constitution, a whole document, integrated in its parts. It had to be
voted upon as a document; the voter could not choose those parts
he favored and reject those he opposed. No delegate was completely
happy with everything the Convention did. Thus it is hardly surpris-
ing that few citizens were. Everyone could find something to disagree
with; the strategy of the opponents was built almost entirely upon
this fact. Except for a general ideological attack mounted by S.O.S.,
the thrusts of the opponents were aimed at specifics. Some opposing
groups based their opposition on a single item. These people were
not inclined to adhere to the admonition to determine whether the
good outweighed the bad; to them one apple tainted the whole barrel.
46Note 4 supra.
1Letter from Emory Dobson, Managing Editor of the County Record of
Denton, Maryland to Edward H. Seneff, Managing Editor of Publishers Auxilliary.
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The points in this constitution that aggravated entrenched in-
terests were single ones, scattered throughout the document. The only
way to avoid that aggravation was to veto the whole document. If
some way could have been found to isolate these factors and to provide
separate votes upon them, it is conceivable that all might actually
have been adopted. But when you add to the opponents of 19-year
olds voting, those local officials upset by losing their constitutional
status and throw in the politicians agitated by the single-member
district imposition as well as the regional government opponents, the
opposition quickly swells in size. This is not to argue that this consti-
tution as written could have been offered in pieces; only a small num-
ber of parts might have been isolated for separate submission. Very
definitely, to accomplish this the document would have to be written
in a different way. However this could have been done if it had been
planned for. The result may not have been as attractive a document,
but it might now be the law of Maryland.
The Unbending Reformers. The final latent issue resulted from
the character of the delegates themselves and their general approach
to constitutional revision. Surely there were men of considerable
political experience and stature in the Convention but the majority
of these had already retired from the political arena. The majority of
delegates eschewed politics in the common sense of the term and
indeed seemed to feel that any concession in the name of politics was
a compromise of their fundamental responsibilities. A decidely anti-
political atmosphere pervaded the Convention and its total operation.
Men active in the political affairs of the state at the legislative, local
government and party level were heavily suspect in Convention
chambers. Delegates obviously distrusted their motives, suspected their
interests and tended to regard their criticisms of specific Convention
actions as self-serving. This feeling was probably not as strong as
the politicians themselves felt, but without question the politicians
felt ill at ease in the Convention environs and tended to stay away
except when some matter of specific interest was being discussed.
The document the delegates fashioned challenged both the opera-
tors of the political system of the state in Annapolis and in the counties
and cut drastically at the powers and symbols of the people
in the more bucolic areas without providing compensating concessions.
The Convention was dominated by the urban and suburban based
anti-political civic reformers. These groups understandably were com-
mitted to significant change. They were tired of the shenanigans of
politicians. They were determined that the long awaited reapportion-
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ment of the legislative power would have a meaningful impact upon
the state policy.
The political establishment felt threatened by the transformation
of the Comptroller's office. Political organizations, particularly in
Baltimore City, faced radical change, if not total extinction, as a result
of the imposition of the single-member district. The attack was most
sharply felt in the rural areas which were still reeling from the impact
of reapportionment. Except for the partial compromise on the size
of the legislature, a compromise won only over the bitter opposition
of the suburban reformers and with the help of some urban area
delegates of the political type, the document contained little that
seemed to the rural dwellers of the state to offset what they were
required to give up. Jacksonion democracy with its plethora of elected
officers may be suspect in the suburbs but it still grasps the public's
imagination in the wide open spaces. To rural and small town
America, registers of wills, clerks of courts, judges of Orphans Courts
and sheriffs have high status in the community. The officials prize their
electoral status and neither they nor the citizens view their positions
as merely civil service.
The idea of voluntarily passing control over to an urban-dominated
government, even though that urban area is the majority, and the
consequent surrender of local offices to an unknown quantity is not
an easy one to sell. A document insensitive to the felt needs of a
particular group of people is not likely to draw much support from
that group of people. Timed as the referendum was, shortly after
the urban riots in Baltimore and Washington, the prospect of urban
control was something less than appealing to the conservatives of small
town and rural Maryland. Efficient government for all does not really
answer the old political question of "What have you done for me
lately?" Whether the constitution would have passed had the grass-
roots politicians and the rural folk been more mollified is a matter
of conjecture. That their disaffection contributed mightily to the
defeat of the document is beyond question-while containing only
21 per cent of Maryland's population, the rural areas voted 71.6 per
cent against the new constitution and produced 29 per cent of the
opposing votes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Underneath it all the failure in Maryland was a failure of the
democratic process. Both the leaders and the people fell short of
what the democratic system demands of them.
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The leaders of reform failed too often to trust the people, to take
them into their confidence, to consult realistically with their grass
roots political leadership, to recognize the very unrepresentativeness
of the group chosen to write the constitution.
The grass roots political leadership failed by refusing to recognize
the value implicit in the proposed document and thus to put them-
selves forcefully into the campaign for approval. Many of them now
say, "We tried to tell those reformers...." But this begs the question.
Politicians worth their salt are more than bellwethers of public
sentiment; they are educators. Surely, their job was to express their
concerns to the drafters; but it was also to tell the people that the
draft constitution was the hope of Maryland. Certainly there were
personal risks involved, but the public stakes were high.
The leaders of the opposition failed. Many of the opponents
opposed for selfish reasons; to save a job, to protect an interest. Others
sincerely feared the kind of government that the new constitution
might bring-active, vital, responsive government-and they were
conservative and fearful of bigger government. Yet their choice was
not between big and little government, but only between the kinds
of big government. Their efforts to defeat this draft contributed to the
achievement of what they feared the most, big Federal government.
Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Contraction of the state func-
tions invites expansion of national functions.
And perhaps most frustrating of all, the people failed. They
listened to the soothsayers, the misinformers. They voted their pre-
judice and not their rational interest or the public interest. They
vented their spleen against "the establishment" not weighing the
advantages they might derive from the constitutional document regard-
less of who wrote it.
The principal question that lingers from the entire Maryland
experience is whether the democratic process will permit extensive,
one-shot confrontation of broad problems of government, or only
patchwork, half-way pragmatic solutions to specific problems as they
arise. Perhaps the Maryland defeat results largely from poor timing
as suggested above. Perhaps also this era, in which the political
factions are encouraged to manipulate the symbols of frustration and
fear, may pass and society may once again enjoy and reflect greater
optimism and idealism. Whatever be the answers to these funda-
mental questions, for the foreseeable future the cause of state consti-
tutional revision and of governmental reform, whether constitutional
or otherwise, has been greatly set back by the failure of the demo-
cratic process in the state of Maryland.
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